We propose an efficient quantum protocol performing quantum bit commitment, which is a simple cryptographic primitive involved with two parties, called a committer and a verifier. Our protocol is non-interactive, uses no supplemental shared information, and achieves computational concealing and statistical binding under a natural complexity-theoretical assumption. An earlier protocol in the literature relies on the existence of an efficient quantum one-way function. Our protocol, on the contrary, exploits a seemingly weaker assumption on computational difficulty of distinguishing two specific ensembles of reduced quantum states. This assumption is guaranteed by, for example, computational hardness of solving the graph automorphism problem efficiently on a quantum computer.
Introduction
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive between two parties and its schemes have been applied to build other useful cryptographic protocols, including secure coin flipping, zero-knowledge proofs, secure multiparty computation, signature schemes, and secret sharing. A protocol for the bit commitment demands the following two security notions: concealing and binding. In a committing phase, Alice (committer) first commits a bit and sends Bob (verifier) its encrypted information, from which Bob cannot decipher her bit. In an opening phase, she reveals her bit; however, Bob can detect her wrongdoing if she presents the bit different from what she had committed in the earlier phase.
A quantum key distribution scheme [1] is well-known to be unconditionally secure, whereas it is proven that no quantum bit commitment scheme achieves unconditional security [9, 13] . Chailloux and Kerenidis [3] recently argued that no protocol for quantum bit commitment achieves a cheating probability of less than 0.739. These facts immediately prompt us to seek a reasonable means to build practically durable protocols for quantum bit commitment. Technological limitations of current quantum device, on one hand, have been used to design feasible protocols in, e.g., [6, 7] . Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail [8] , on the other hand, used a computationally difficult problem to construct a (non-interactive) protocol for quantum bit commitment. Their protocol requires the total communication cost of O(n) qubits, where n is a security parameter, and the security of the protocol relies on the existence of quantum one-way permutation (namely, a function that permutes a given set of strings with the one-way property that the function is easily computed buy is hard to be inverted). In particular, the binding condition for the protocol is proven as follows. If the condition does not hold, then Alice must have a strategy to deceive Bob. Using her strategy, we can efficiently invert a given quantum one-way permutation on a quantum computer, leading to a contradiction. This protocol was later extended by Tanaka [14] to quantum string commitment using an additional technique of quantum fingerprinting to reduce the communication cost between Alice and Bob. Recently, Koshiba and Odaira [12] reduced this assumption to the existence of quantum one-way functions.
Whether a quantum one-way permutation exists is still an open question and it seems quite difficult to settle down the question. Naturally, we can ask if a use of quantum one-way permutation can be replaced by any other (seemingly weaker) computational assumption. In this paper, we look for other means to construct a quantum bit commitment protocol; in particular, we are interested in a computational problem of distinguishing between two ensembles of quantum states. This type of problem has been used to guarantee the security of quantum protocols. Chailloux, Kerenidis, and Rosgen [4] drew from a slightly technical assumption of QSZK QMA, † which is not known to be true, a conclusion that a scheme for "auxiliaryinput" quantum bit commitment (which allows Alice and Bob to apply the same POVM operations during the committing phase) exists. The purpose of this paper is to present a new scheme for quantum bit commitment with no such auxiliary inputs.
In 2005, Kawachi, Koshiba, Nishimura, and Yamakami [11] devised two special ensembles of (reduced) quantum states and, from these ensembles, they built a quantum public-key cryptosystem whose security relies on a computational assumption that the ensembles are hard to distinguish efficiently. These ensembles posses quite useful properties (stated in Section 3.1), which are interesting on its own light and have been sought for other applications. As such an application, we actually use the two ensembles to build the aforementioned new scheme for quantum bit commitment. Our scheme, given in Section 3.3, is non-interactive, uses no auxiliary inputs, and achieves computational concealing and statistical binding at communication cost of O(n log n) qubits. Those security conditions of our scheme follows from an assumption on computational hardness of distinguishing the two ensembles. Note that, if this hardness assumption fails to hold, then, for example, we can efficiently solve on a quantum computer a classical problem, known as the graph automorphism problem (GA), in which we are asked to determine whether a given undirected graph is isomorphic to itself. This problem is not yet known to be either polynomial-time solvable or NP-complete. More importantly, our scheme has a concrete, explicit description, independent of the correctness of the assumption, and potentially it might be applied to other fields.
The computationally concealing condition for our scheme follows directly from the indistinguishability of two encrypted quantum states produced for two different committed bits 0 and 1. The statistical binding condition is met by an application of state partitioning, which is a means to partition a given quantum state into two specific orthogonal states. The details of the security conditions will be given in Section 4.
Main Theorem
Throughout this paper, we will work with various finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. For instance, H 2 denotes the 2-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by a binary basis {|0 , |1 }; that is, H 2 = span{|0 , |1 }. We use Dirac's ket notation |φ to express quantum states and φ| for the conjugate transpose of |φ . The notation φ|ψ expresses the inner product of |φ and |ψ . The norm of |φ is given as |φ =
φ|ψ . An orthogonal measurement (or von Neumann measurement) of a quantum state is described by a set of orthogonal projections acting on a given Hilbert space.
We will use informal term of quantum algorithms to describe transformations of quantum bits (or qubits) throughout this paper. A quantum algorithm has been often modeled by a mechanical device of quantum Turing machine [2] or quantum circuit families [15] . We are particularly interested in quantum algorithms that terminate within a polynomial number of steps with respect to the size of input instances. We call such algorithms polynomial-time algorithms.
We choose the following definition for the computationally concealing condition, because this captures a more intuitive notion of Bob being unable to gaining any significant amount of information out of Alice. As we will show in Lemma 4.2, this definition comes from the indistinguishability between two quantum states sent from Alice.
In a committing phase, Alice encodes her committed bit a into a quantum state and sends its (possibly reduced) state χ a to Bob. We demand the following security against Bob. Definition 2.1 (computational concealing) A non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme is computationally concealing if, for any positive polynomial p, there is no polynomial-time quantum algorithm that outputs a from instance χ a with error probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(n) for any n ∈ N + .
The security against Alice requires the following notion of statistical binding. In the committing phase, Alice starts with |0 . She applies a quantum transformation U 1 and sends a subsystem H commit . At the beginning of an opening phase (or a revealing phase), Alice applies U (a) 2 , where a ∈ {0, 1}, if she wants to convince Bob that her committed bit is a. Alice's cheating strategy is modeled by a triplet
a (n) be the probability that Bob convinces himself that a is truly a committed bit, provided that Bob faithfully follows the scheme. Definition 2.2 (statistical binding) A non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme is statistically binding if there exists a negligible function ε(n) such that, for any cheating strategy
1 (n) ≤ 1 + ε(n) holds for every length n ∈ N + .
Our main theorem concerns the notion of indistinguishable ensembles of quantum states which are generated efficiently. First, we introduce the necessary terminology to explain the statement.
It is time to introduce extra notions and notations. Let N + denote the set of all positive integers and set N = {0} ∪ N + . An ensemble {ρ(n)} n∈N + of (reduced) quantum states is said to be efficiently generated if there exist two polynomially-bounded ‡ functions q, ℓ : N + → N + and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm ‡ A function f : N + → N is polynomially bounded if there exists a (positive) polynomial p for which f (n) ≤ p(n) for all A such that, on every input |1 n |0 (n ∈ N + ), (1) A generates |1 n |Φ of q(n) qubits and (2) ρ(n) is obtained by tracing out the first ℓ(n) qubits of |Φ ; in notation, ρ(n) = tr ℓ(n) (|Φ Φ|). Let {ρ(n)} n∈N + and {χ(n)} n∈N + be two ensembles of (reduced) quantum states. We say that a quantum algorithm A distinguishes between {ρ(n)} n∈N + and {χ(n)} n∈N + with advantage δ(n) [11] if, for every n ∈ N + , it holds that
The succinct notation A(1 n , ρ(n)) in Eq. (1) formally expresses A(|1 n 1 n | ⊗ ρ(n)). A function µ : N → [0, 1] is called negligible if, for any positive polynomial p, µ(n) ≤ 1/p(n) holds for all but finitely many numbers n ∈ N. If if there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that distinguishes between two ensembles {ρ(n)} n∈N + and {χ(n)} n∈N + of (reduced) quantum states with nonnegligible advantage, then the two ensembles are said to be efficiently indistinguishable. Otherwise, they are called efficiently indistinguishable.
Theorem 2.3 (main theorem) There exists a pair of efficiently generated ensembles of (reduced) quantum states such that (1) they are efficiently indistinguishable and (2) from them, we can construct a noninteractive quantum bit commitment with computationally canceling and statistically binding conditions. In Section 3.1, we will explicitly define an ensemble pair described in Theorem 2.3. With help of [11, Theorem 2.5], the existence of such an ensemble pair is guaranteed if the graph automorphism problem (GA) is difficult to solve efficiently on any quantum computer. As an immediate consequence of the theorem, we obtain the following statement.
Corollary 2.4
If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA with error probability at least 2 −n , where n is the vertex set size if an input graph, then there exists a non-interactive quantum bit commitment with the conditions of computationally canceling and statistically binding.
In the subsequent sections, we will prove Theorem 2.3.
Quantum Bit Commitment
We will present a scheme for non-interactive quantum bit commitment. Our scheme is based on an ensemble of special quantum states, introduced in [11] . In Section 3.1, we will explain these quantum states. A useful property of state partitioning will be discussed in Section 3.2. Finally, we will present in Section 3.3 our protocol of quantum bit commitment between Alice and Bob.
Special Quantum States with Hidden Permutations
As a preparation to our quantum bit commitment scheme, we will introduce an ensemble of special quantum states given in [11] .
Let n be any number in N + , which is used as a security parameter; for our purpose, we demand that n is even and n/2 is odd. Let S n denote the set of all permutations σ : [n] → [n], where [n] is the integer set {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}. Since |S n | = n!, every element in S n can be expressed using at most ⌈log(n!)⌉ (= O(n log n)) qubits. The special set K n is a subset of S n , consisting only of π satisfying ππ = id and π(i) = i for all i ∈ [n].
Given three elements s ∈ {0, 1}, σ ∈ S n , and π ∈ K n , we define a useful quantum state |φ
For each permutation π in K n , we partition S n into two subsetsŜ 0 andŜ 1 , which satisfy the following condition: for every index a ∈ {0, 1} and for all elements σ ∈ S n , σ ∈Ŝ a implies σπ ∈Ŝ 1−a . Let S (π) n denote one of these subsets of S n that contains id. Notice that S (π) n is uniquely determined from π. It is easily seen that the set B (π) = {|φ
n , s ∈ {0, 1}} forms a computational basis for the Hilbert space
In what follows, we fix n ∈ N + and π ∈ K n . For each bit s ∈ {0, 1}, we define the quantum state
Notice that the quantum states ρ (π) 0 (n) and ρ (π) 1 (n) are respectively denoted ρ + π (n) and ρ − π (n) in [11] . For convenience, we use the notation |Φ (π) s (n) to denote a pure quantum state
s (n) coincides with the partial trace tr 1 
, where tr 1 is the partial trace over the first register (that is, the operator tracing out the first register). It is also useful to note that σ∈Sn |σ |φ
σ,s |σ ; thus, it holds that tr 1 (|Φ
To make our notation simple, we hereafter omit "n" whenever "n" is clear from the context. Note that any quantum state |γ in H Sn can be expressed as a∈{0,1} σ∈Sn α a,σ,π |φ (π) σ,a for any fixed permutation π ∈ K n . Basic properties of |φ
σ,s and |Φ (π) s are summarized in the following lemma. In the lemma, we conveniently use two notations "∧" and "∨" to mean the logical connectives "AND" and "OR", respectively.
Lemma 3.1 Let n ∈ N + , s ∈ {0, 1}, π ∈ K n , and σ, τ ∈ S n .
1. |φ
Proof.
(1) Since σππ = σ, it follows that √ 2|φ
σπ,s . This implies that |φ σ,s = (−1) s |φ σπ,s , leading to the desired consequence.
(2) For simplicity, we write P for φ
τ,s . Note that 2P = 2( σ|τ + σ|τ π ) since σπ|τ π = σ|τ . Since π = id, σ|τ = 1 implies σ|τ π = 0 and also σ|τ π = 1 implies σ|τ = 0. Thus, if either τ = σ or τ = σπ, we have 2P = 2; otherwise, 2P = 0. The other case of s = 1 is similarly handled.
(4) By setting P = φ
τ,0 , we obtain 2P = σ|τ + σ|τ κ + σπ|τ + σπ|τ κ . If π = κ, then (3) implies the desired result. Now, assume that π = κ. If σ = τ , then σ|τ = 1 and the other terms in the above expansion of 2P are all zeros, because π, κ = id and π = κ. From these results follows 2P = 1. Similarly, if σ = τ κ, then σ|τ κ = 1 and the other terms are zeros; thus, we obtain 2P = 1. The remaining case of σ = τ π is similarly handled. When all the above-mentioned cases fail, no terms in the expansion of 2P are 1. Therefore, we conclude that 2P = 0.
(
In what follows, we assume that π = κ. If σ = τ , then it follows that 2P = σ|τ = 1 because π, κ = id and π = κ. Thus, we obtain 2P = 1. Similarly, when σ = τ κ, we obtain 2P = σ|τ κ = 1. From σπ = τ , it follows that 2P = − σπ|τ = −1. Finally, we note that σπ = τ κ implies 2P = − σπ|τ κ = −1. ✷ We give another useful property of |φ (π) σ,s . This property will play an important role in Section 5.1.
Lemma 3.2
For fixed π ∈ K n and σ ∈ S n , it holds that |φ
Proof.
Fix π ∈ K n and σ ∈ S n . Note that the value √ 2 κ∈Kn (|φ
, which equals |K n |(|σ − |σπ ) + κ∈Kn (|σκ − |σπκ ). The last term equals κ∈Kn |σκ − κ∈Kn |σπκ . Let us consider the function f : K n → K n ∪ {id} defined as f (κ) = πκ. This f satisfies the following three properties: (i) f is one-to-one, (ii) f (π) = id, and (iii) there is no element κ ∈ K n satisfying f (κ) = π. We conclude that f is a bijection on the restricted domain K n − {π}. This fact implies that κ∈Kn |σκ − κ∈Kn |σπκ = |σπ − |σ .
σ,1 . From this equality, the lemma follows immediately. ✷
Hereafter, we will give two quantum procedures, which are useful in the description of our quantum bit commitment scheme in Section 3.3. First, we introduce several useful unitary operations. The Hadamard transform H acts on the system H 2 as H|s =
(|0 + (−1) s |1 ) for every bit s ∈ {0, 1}. The controlled-π operator C π acts on H 2 ⊗ H Sn as C π |a |σ = |a |σπ if a = 1, and |a |σ otherwise. The controlled-NOT id operator CN OT id acts on H 2 ⊗ H Sn as CN OT id |a |σ = (N OT |a )|σ if σ = id, and |a |σ otherwise. Moreover, let U sgn denote a unitary operator mapping |σ to (−1) sgn(σ) |σ , where σ ∈ S n and sgn(σ) is 1 (0, resp.) if σ is an even (odd, resp.) permutation in S n . The controlled-SAWP operator C (i,j) swap (with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n) exchanges the contents of the ith and jth registers among n registers; that is,
We will present two useful quantum transforms.
[Procedure 1] The following procedure P 1 can generate the quantum state H = |0 |σ |π |φ
Sn from |0 |σ |π |id if π = id. To |π |0 |id in the system H (2)
Sn , we first apply two operators I ⊗ H ⊗ I and I ⊗ C π , where H is the Hadamard transform. This process generates a quantum state
|π (|0 |id + |1 |π ). Since π = id, we apply I ⊗ CN OT id and generate the
Sn ⊗ H
Sn . Multiply σ in the first register from the left to the second register, generating
|σ (|σ + |σπ ). In the end, we obtain |0 |σ |π |φ σ∈Sn |σ (|id + |π ). Multiply each σ in the first register to the content of the second register. We then obtain
There is a simple procedure P 2 that transforms |φ
σ,1−s without knowing (s, π) as follows. Initially, we have |φ
σ,s . The resulted quantum state is
Since π is an odd permutation, this state equals
, then we im-
State Partitioning
Our quantum bit commitment protocol in Section 3.3 requires a method to "partition" a given quantum state χ in the system H Sn into two orthogonal states χ 0 and χ 1 that satisfy an extra property. A basic idea of state partitioning is inspired by a trapdoor property of [11, Theorem 2.1]. Let n ∈ N + and χ be any reduced state in H Sn . This state can be expressed as χ = χ 0 + χ 1 , where
⊗2 . Since the second register of H contains π, we can freely use the controlled-π operator
When we observe the first register, we find 0 (resp., 1) with probability exactly Here, we will briefly discuss the correctness of the above algorithm. Let χ be given at Step (S1). Assume that χ = σ∈Sn s∈{0,1} p σ,s |φ 
σ,s | for each s. Initially, we have a state |Φ ′ = |0 |π |Φ , which equals σ∈Sn s∈{0,1} √ p σ |0 |π |s |σ |φ
σ,s . Since we work on a purified state, it is convenient to expand C π toC π as follows.
swap .
Step (S2) produces Next, we want to examine the behavior of C SP A on instance |κ κ| ⊗ χ given in Step (S1), where κ is different from π. In what follows, let κ be any element in K n − {π}. Recall that |Φ = σ∈Sn √ p σ |s |σ |φ
σ,s . Here, the quantum algorithm starts with |Φ ′ κ = |0 |κ |Φ . Following Step (S2), we calculate (H ⊗ I ⊗4 )C κ (H ⊗ I ⊗4 )|0 |π |ψ 0 . Note that, since the content of the second register is κ, we apply C κ instead of C π .
The algorithm C SP A produces a quantum state
This is equivalent to
When a = 0 and s = 0, we obtain
σπ,0 = 0 by Lemma 3.1(3), the norm of this state is
Similarly, when a = 0 and s = 1, the state
σπ,0 ) has norm 1 2 σ p σ,1 . By combining those values, we conclude that the probability of observing 0 in the first register is 
A New Protocol
We will present a new quantum bit commitment protocol. We use the following quantum system between Alice (committer) and Bob (verifier): 
In
Step (R2), Bob does not observe the subsystem H opn1 because, otherwise, the entanglement between H open1 and H commit could be destroyed and Steps (R3) and (R5) might not work properly.
In the subsequent section, we will analyze the above protocol in details.
Security Analysis of the Scheme
We will examine the security of the quantum bit commitment protocol given in Section 3.3. We will show that our protocol is computationally concealing in Section 4.1. This is a direct consequence of [11] . A more complex analysis is required to show the statistically binding condition in 4.2.
Computationally Concealing Condition
The concealing condition for bit commitment requires that Bob cannot retrieve any information on a during a committing phase after honest Alice commits a and sends a quantum state associated with a. Intuitively, this condition is satisfied because Bob does not know γ, which locks the information on a inside the quantum state, and thus there may be no way for Bob to obtain the information on a with probability higher than a given parameter. In our scheme, the notion of computational concealing, given in Section 2, is rephrased as follows. Our quantum bit commitment scheme is computationally concealing if, for any positive polynomial p, there is no polynomial-time quantum algorithm that outputs a from ρ a with error probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(n) for any n ∈ N + . We will show that our protocol achieves the above computational concealing condition under the assumption that GA is hard to solve efficiently on a quantum computer. Theorem 4.1 Let n be an agreed security parameter. If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA with non-negligible probability, then our scheme satisfies the computational concealing condition. Before proving Lemma 4.2, we give the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Assume that there is an efficient quantum algorithm A that produces a from ρ (π) a with probability at least 1/2 + 1/p(n) for a certain fixed positive polynomial p. Let us consider the following quantum algorithm B: on input χ ∈ {ρ with advantage at least 2/p(n). By Lemma 4.2, we conclude that GA is polynomial-time solvable on a quantum computer with non-negligible probability. ✷ To prove Lemma 4.2, we recall the computational distinction problem QSCD ff introduced by Kawachi et al. [11] . Since we need only a restricted form of this problem, we re-formulate this problem in the following fashion. Let k be a fixed constant in N + .
k-Quantum State Computational Distinction Problem k-QSCD ff (weaker version):
• Instance: a string 1 n and a k-fold quantum state ρ ⊗k with ρ ∈ {ρ
1 (n)} for a certain fixed (but hidden) permutation π ∈ K n , depending only on n, where n ∈ N + .
• Output: YES, if ρ = ρ For convenience, we say that a quantum algorithm A solves k-QSCD ff with advantage p(n) if A distinguishes between {ρ
Moreover, we say that a quantum algorithm A solves k-QSCD ff with average advantage p on length n if the average, over all π ∈ K n chosen uniformly at random, of the advantage with which A distinguishes between {ρ 
Lemma 4.3 [11]
Let k ∈ N + . If a quantum algorithm A solves k-QSCD ff with average advantage at least 1/p(n) for a certain positive polynomial p, then there exists a quantum algorithm that solves GA for infinitelymany lengths with probability at least 1 − 2e −n , where e is the base of natural logarithms and n refers to the vertex set size of an input graph of GA.
At last, we return to the proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We will show the contrapositive of the lemma. Let k ∈ N + . Assume that there are a positive polynomial p and a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that distinguishes between ρ ⊗k with advantage at least 1/p(n). In other words, we can solve k-QSCD ff in polynomial time with advantage at least 1/p(n). Lemma 4.3 therefore implies that GA is solvable for infinitely-many input lengths n on an appropriate quantum computer in polynomial time with error probability at most 2e −n , which is bounded from above by 2 −n . ✷
Statistically Binding Condition
The binding condition for classical bit commitment requires that adversarial Alice cannot cheat Bob simply by revealing a different bit a ′ together with a different key π ′ to Bob. For quantum bit commitment, Dumais et al. [8] formulated a condition for a quantum bit commitment scheme to be statistically binding in the case of non-interactive schemes. Other definitions for binding condition are found in, e.g., [5] .
Conventionally, we say that Alice unveils a (with probability p) if, in the opening phase, Bob observes a and convinces himself that this is truly a committed bit (with probability p).
Here, we cope with a general adversary model, proposed in [8] , which describes adversarial Alice's attack U as a triplet (U 1 , U 
σ∈Sn π∈Kn |ξ a,π,σ |a |π |σ |γ a,π,σ with a,σ,π |ξ a,π,σ
τ,s for an appropriate set {α (a,π,σ) τ,s } τ,s . Hence, we obtain
a,π,σ |a |π |σ |φ
where |ξ
Step (C4), she sends the system H commit to Bob. The quantum state that Bob receives from adversarial Alice is of the form χ = a,s,σ,τ,π |ξ in order to maximize the probability of unveiling a. Now, she applies U (a) 2 ⊗ I to |η (C1) , where
acts on H (R1) A and I acts on H commit , and then obtains |η
2 ), for each bit a, recall that T (U ) a (n) denotes the probability that, when Alice applies (U 1 , U (a)
2 ) as described above, Bob obtains a by the projection measurement in Step (R2) (with ignoring the values of π and σ) and then accepts Alice's bit a through Steps (R3)-(R5) (in other words, Alice successfully unveils a).
The opening phase of our scheme, assuming that Bob honestly follows Steps (R2)-(R5), is in essence equivalent to the process that Bob immediately measures the system
for any π ∈ K n . To be more precise, we need to introduce four measurement operators M
open2 , and M (a,π,σ) commit acting on H bit , H open1 , H open2 , and H commit that project onto states |a , |π , |σ , and |φ
mix be a measurement operator acting on H open2 ⊗ H commit projecting onto state |Φ
mix for each a ∈ {0, 1}. In our argument that follows shortly, we assume that, instead of Steps (R2)-(R5), Bob simply performs M a in the system H bit ⊗ H open ⊗ H commit . Note that the value T (U ) a (n) associated with Alice's cheating strategy U coincides with (I ⊗ M s )(U (s) 2 ⊗ I)|η (C1) 2 . Let us recall from Section 2 the notion of statistical binding. We rephrase this notion as follows. Our quantum bit commitment scheme is statistically binding if there exists a negligible function ε(n) such that, for any cheating strategy
1 (n) ≤ 1 + ε(n) holds for every length n ∈ N + . We will show that our protocol achieves the statistical binding condition.
Theorem 4.4
If no polynomial-time quantum algorithm solves GA with non-negligible probability, then our quantum bit commitment scheme is statistically binding.
To prove this theorem, we first introduce a new problem, called the hidden permutation search problem, which is closely related to the indistinguishability between ρ • Instance: a string 1 n with n ∈ N + and a quantum state ρ (π) 0 (n) with a certain hidden permutation π ∈ K n .
• Output: π.
We say that a quantum algorithm A solves HPSP with average probability p on length n if, over all permutations π ∈ K n chosen uniformly at random, A takes instance (1 n , ρ
0 (n)) and outputs π with probability exactly p. 
a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves 2-QSCD ff with average advantage at least 1/q(n) for infinitely-many lengths n.
Proof.
Let p be a positive polynomial and let A be a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that solves HPSP with probability at least 1/p(n). Let ρ ⊗ ρ with ρ ∈ {ρ
1 } be an instance of 2-QSCD ff , where π is an unknown permutation in K n . Let s ∈ {0, 1} and assume that ρ = ρ (π) s . Now, our task is to determine whether s = 0 or s = 1.
Let A 0 be a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that generates π from input (1 n , ρ
0 ) with probability, say, γ n , which is at least 1/p(n). Let A 1 be a quantum algorithm that takes input ρ (π)
(|0 |Φ + |1 |Φ ). We apply A 0 and A 1 separately to generate
It follows that κ∈Kn |0 |κ |ξ κ,0 + κ∈Kn |1 |κ |ξ κ,1 . By our assumption, we obtain |ξ π,s 2 = γ n for every s ∈ {0, 1}.
Next, we apply C SP A to the second register and the second input state ρ
s . Finally, we observe the first register and output its content s. If κ is different from π, then after running C SP A , we observe 0 and 1 with equal probability, as we have argued in Section 3.2.
Therefore, the probability that we correctly obtain s is exactly
Calling the entire quantum algorithm by B, we have just proven that Prob[B(1 n , ρ
Since γ n ≥ 1/p(n), the lemma follows. ✷
Using the above lemmas, we can prove Theorem 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We want to show the contrapositive of the theorem. First, assume that there exist a positive polynomial p and Alice's cheating strategy U = (U 1 , U
1 (n) ≥ 1 + 1/p(n) for infinitely-many lengths n. By Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, we conclude that 2-QSCD ff can be solved by a certain polynomial-time quantum algorithm with average advantage at least 1/q(n) for a certain polynomial q. By Lemma 4.3, GA must be solved on a quantum computer in polynomial time with average probability at least 1/r(n) for a certain polynomial r. ✷
Quantum Algorithm for HPSP
In the previous section, we have left Lemma 4.5 unproven. Here, we will give its missing proof by constructing an appropriate quantum algorithm that solves HPSP with non-negligible probability, provided that the statistically binding condition does not hold.
Recall that adversarial Alice takes (U 1 , U
2 , U
2 ) as her cheating strategy. To simplify our analysis, as in [8] , we replace (
† , without changing the probability that Alice successfully cheats Bob. For convenience, hereafter, we write U 1 and U 
Distillation Algorithm
We will present an important subroutine that makes up of the quantum algorithm that solves HPSP in Section 5.2. Recall that adversarial Alice is now taking the cheating strategy U = (U 1 , U (0) 2 , I), while Bob faithfully follows the protocol.
Let us recall from Eq. (2) that |η (C1) is of the form π∈Kn σ,τ ∈S
τ,s , which is obtained by an application of U 1 ⊗ I to |0 in the entire system
= I. For convenience, we define |η
perf to be the normalized state of (I ⊗ M 1 )|η (C1) ; that is, |η It is not difficult to see that the above algorithm A dis transforms |η (C1) into a quantum state |η
In the following argument, we are focused on |η
perf . Now, we fix a permutation π ′ ∈ K n , which is a hidden permutation of an instance ρ
of HPSP. Note that the Hilbert space span{|φ
is defined in Section 3.1. First, we want to measure H commit in states |φ
n . This is formally done by a measurement operatorM π ′ ≡ σ∈S
commit , which projects a quantum state in H commit onto |φ
perf , we want to determine an actual form of |η (π ′ ) . For brevity, we set
σ,0 .
Proof.
As the first step, we intend to express |η
perf can be expressed as π,σ |Θ π,σ |φ
perf is further written as
since
for all permutations σ ∈ S n .
Since |η
Therefore, we obtain |η
by the definition of δ. ✷ For convenience, we denote by |η
norm the normalized state of |η
.
Proof. We want to estimate the value |η
If this claim is true, then |η
norm is written as
The aforementioned claim (*) will be proven as follows. First, we note that |η In the subsequent subsection, we will explain how to solve HPSP efficiently on a quantum computer.
HPSP Algorithm
To solve HPSP, we first generate a quantum state |η
norm with an appropriate probability, apply U
2 , and finally measure selected qubits. The following quantum algorithm A HP SP behaves exactly as described. In what follows, we tend to drop superscript "U" from T with an unknown permutation π ′ ∈ K n . We consider its purification of the form |Φ τ,0 |τ . Since we are given only a reduced state ρ, we assume that we are allowed to manipulate only the first register of |Φ . Starting with |0 , we apply U 1 ⊗ I and then run A dis . We then obtain T 1 (n)|η To complete the proof of Lemma 4.5, it suffices to show that the success probability p π ′ of obtaining π ′ from ρ (π ′ ) 0 by running A HP SP , over all π ∈ K n chosen uniformly at random, is at least 1 8p(n) 2 . This statement follows from two separate claims. The first claim below makes a bridge between the probability p π ′ and the state (I ⊗ M 0 )(U Claim 1 For any fixed π ′ ∈ K n , the success probability p π ′ of obtaining π ′ from ρ 
Proof.
Recall thatM π ′ ≡ σ∈S Through Steps (M1)-(M4), we generates T 1 (n)(1 − |ξ 1,π ′ 2 )|η
norm . From Steps (M5)-(M6), the success probability p π ′ for a fixed π ′ is exactly T 1 (n)(1 − |ξ 1,π ′ ) 2 )(I ⊗ M 0 )(U
2 ⊗ I)|η 
